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The Oxford Handbook Of Crime And Public Policy Pdf

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The Oxford Handbook of Criminological Theory is organized not around schools of thought but around themes that shape much thinking about and research on crime. This more unconventional approach seeks to show that criminological theory is not static but dynamic. The Oxford Handbook of Criminological Theory.

Whittington Oxford University Press,

The Oxford Handbook Of Law And Politics Pdf

The debate about crime and its control has in recent years featured regular appearances by actors voicing public demands for greater security and punishment on the one hand and those seeking to prevent crime by means of some kind of technical or expert intervention on the other. These positions—which are often termed populism and technocracy—appear to press conflicting claims.

Proponents of technocracy conversely worry that crime policy risks being unduly influenced by vote-chasing politicians and mass media demonization and driven by an emotive irrationalism concerned more with symbolic display than effective performance in tackling crime. Often today, discussions about how to respond to crime appear to be a contest between these two seemingly diametrically opposed positions. These ways of thinking about and acting upon crime have of late received considerable attention in criminology.

In the case of populism, research has generally sought to identify the social conditions that have led to the emergence of penal populism as a force such as declining deference and loss of trust in authority or has tried to explain the role of populism in generating the penal excess experienced across the USA and the Anglophone world in recent decades e.

Bottoms ; Pratt By contrast, accounts of technocratic or evidence-based thinking more commonly hail from its proponents. These have generally taken the form of reports p. Sherman et al. Our purpose in this chapter is not of this kind: we aim neither to trash populism and technocracy as approaches to crime control, nor to champion them.

Nor are we primarily interested in discovering the causes of populism and technocracy or assessing their respective influence over penal policy in different jurisdictions.

Instead, we want to examine populism and technocracy as political ideologies in the sense outlined in the work of Michael Freeden , , We propose to treat populism and technocracy as ideologies in this sense.

This reconstructive element of this task entails that we ask of populism and technocracy the following questions: What are the constitutive concepts and central claims of each position? To what visions of good crime governance and the good society are their proponents committed? How do they understand—and what resources can they offer to—the project of developing democratically legitimate practices of crime control?

The task of providing a best case interpretation of the visions of crime control to be found in populist and technocratic ideologies takes up most of the ensuing chapter. We embark, in the next section, on an assessment of populism as a general mode of political intervention and especially its offspring penal populism. This clarification of what is at stake in disputes between populism and technocracy underpins our principal evaluative claim, to which we turn in conclusion.

We dispute the assumption that they are competing alternatives. To secure a better handle on penal populism it is helpful to begin outside of criminology, with populism proper. What is populism?

What kind of ideology is it? To what political family does it properly belong? These are not easy questions to answer. Unlike other political ideologies e. Its concerns, moreover, tend to be local and particular rather than global or universal, as do its heroes Stanley Populism also carries divergent historical resonances and contemporary meanings across different parts of the globe—it has, for example, in both North and South America, a connection to progressive politics that is almost entirely absent in Europe where it is associated with right-wing, xenophobic political movements.

Rather, populism is a label fixed on politicians or political parties by external observers, usually as a term of abuse. Yet there is more to populism than that. It is possible to detect in the political movements and figures to whom the label populist is commonly applied—the Front National in France, the Austrian Freedom Party, the United Kingdom Independence Party, the Tea Party, Donald Trump, and so on—a recurring cluster of claims that express an underlying ideology.

Defending the people tends therefore to involve affirming the correctness and rights of majorities over those of minorities. Secondly, the people are understood to be in a mutually antagonistic relation to a malign, self-interested elite. The core claim is that elites seek to narrow the limits of what, politically, can be said and done in ways that are contemptuous of the concerns of ordinary people and unable to advance their aspirations.

Thirdly, populism is committed to the ideal of popular sovereignty. The purpose of politics is to express and enact the general will which populists hold to be unified and transparent. The will of the people is capable of being advanced by strong, charismatic leadership—by leaders unafraid to say out loud what people are really thinking. Populists object to the grubby process of bargaining and accommodation in which politicians routinely engage. They exude impatience with human rights, institutional checks and balances, and unelected bodies—all of which obstruct the will of the people.

Populism is, in this regard, frequently a politics of personality. It tends to favour a binary worldview. Populism is, we might provisionally observe, a force for p.

Berezin This helps to account for why crime is never very far from the mobilizing rhetoric of xenophobic populist movements. Our diagnosis of penal populism must remain attentive to these dynamics.

The analysis of penal populism has—as with populism proper—largely been conducted by criminologists with a commitment to the sorts of rational policy-making and liberal crime policy that populism has assailed—criminologists, as Garland has observed, who typically feel little obligation to justify their own preferences or to explain why the public ought to defer to experts.

Such analysis has in the main deemed penal populism as a pathology and remained rather tone-deaf to the character of its appeal. The literature on penal populism has sought to identify its conditions of emergence, assess its contribution to punitive excess, and figure out what needs to be done to counter it e.

Roberts et al. It is to that latter task that we turn here. In the first place, penal populism denigrates liberal-minded, expert-led criminal justice and its remote rationality. Pressed by the tabloid media, by assorted groups p. It also took issue with what it represented as the vested interests and complacency of criminal justice professionals.

Penal populism challenged the substantive concerns of penal elites with due process rights and rehabilitation; their failure to recognize, still less stem, the relentless rise in volume crime; their behind closed doors, we-know-best methods of administering justice, and their inability to empathize with, or attend to, the anxieties of the public and experiences of victims.

In all these ways, penal populism casts aspersions upon the claims of penal experts. Secondly, penal populism presses the claims of those groups excluded from influencing criminal justice by bureaucratic and professional elites. This is done in a number of idioms. Penal populism has, thirdly, insisted upon the properly emotive nature of crime making crime control affective rather than effective, or preferring to assume that these will coincide and the inherently moral quality of punishment.

It is no accident that populists tend not to lobby for rehabilitation and parole. How then is one to assess the conception of good crime governance found in populist ideology?

What resources, if any, does it bring to the building of a better politics of crime? We return to this issue in the conclusion. But for now two broad interpretations can helpfully be introduced. The first appraises populism positively as a force with potential to expose and make good the failings of democracy, while fretting about its anti-liberal commitments.

Arditi ; Laclau In this regard, populism presents as a resource of hope. Faint echoes of this political evaluation can be found here and there in the literature on penal populism.

More recently, Albert Dzur : ch. The worry about populism expressed in this interpretation is not, then, about its democratic credentials. This anti-liberalism has also long underpinned the dismay expressed by criminologists in the face of penal populism e. But this second appraisal calls sharply into question the idea that penal populism is a friend of democracy.

From this starting point, what is striking about populism—in crime policy as elsewhere—is its drive to close down spaces of active political deliberation. It is this claim—that populism is not a force for democratizing the politics of crime, but an agent of democratic degeneration—that we develop in conclusion. Technocracy appears to have a relatively poor claim to be considered as an ideology. It barely if ever features in textbook overviews of the ideological landscape.

It rarely mobilizes social groups or the support of political movements. Technocracy claims that public policy outcomes will be improved under systems of rule in which experts take decisions in place of politicians Pastorella , or at least in conditions where political actors scrupulously follow the best available advice deriving from expert evidence.

This can take the form of technocratic government in which experts are invited to become government ministers , or it can entail the delegation of policy fields to selected groups of specialists—as has happened in several jurisdictions in recent years in respect of the transfer of monetary policy to independent central banks.

Over the course of the twentieth century it either resurfaced within, or possessed a close affinity with, various renditions of elitist democracy, from Lippmann , to Schumpeter , to Sartori The delegation of political authority to experts has, moreover, undergone something of a renaissance in recent years. The promotion of expert calculation and technique as ways of delivering better crime prevention and penal policy outcomes can helpfully be understood in this larger historical and intellectual frame.

This approach to crime has gained renewed traction in recent years in criminology and related policy sciences, as well as among police and criminal justice practitioners. It has done so often in response and overt opposition to the populist penal politics we have just described.

It has, as we shall see, come in several variants each offering different diagnoses and policy prescriptions. So what are the principal contentions and aspirations of the epistemic worldview? To what vision of good crime governance are its proponents committed? How are we to judge its conception of a better politics of crime? In this section, we reconstruct the claims found in three variants of epistemic crime control, before offering an overall appraisal of epistemic ideology.

The first variant of epistemic crime control aims to find ways to improve the quality of social information about crime and justice; to create, if you like, a better public opinion. On this view, the key issue that contemporary criminal justice confronts is that people are poorly informed about crime and justice Indermaur and Hough This ignorance, the argument runs, underpins low levels of public confidence in criminal justice and drives demands for greater punitivity.

It is a cognitive deficit upon which populism thrives. They also do not demur from the idea that such opinion should have some, albeit limited, role in shaping penal policy and practice Roberts What is lacking—and urgently needed—are the following things: p. Public attitudes to justice have also been found to become milder and less punitive the more detail people are given about the concrete circumstances of cases and situations Hough and Roberts The lesson drawn from this is that effort needs to be expended on communicating this complexity in the public domain.

In response to the second problem, experiments have been conducted to measure the impact of disseminating factual information on public confidence e.

Mirrlees-Black

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This introduction to the book starts by defining crime. It explains that cross-national agreement about what should and should not be considered as criminal is narrower than is sometimes recognized. Examples are given of various acts that are regarded as criminal in some countries but not others. Crime and its control raises many instrumental, expressive, emotional, and moral issues, the text states. The layout of the book is outlined and some noncontroversial conclusions are offered. Next this introductory text looks at broad public policy approaches for dealing with crime: criminal law enforcement, prevention, harm reduction, regulation, decriminalization, and nonintervention. Next rates and trends are detailed and the costs associated are analysed.

Virtually every important question of public policy today involves an international organization. From trade to intellectual property to health policy and beyond, governments interact with international organizations IOs in almost everything they do. Increasingly, individual citizens are directly affected by the work of IOs. This book gives an overview of the world of IOs today. It emphasizes both the practical aspects of their organization and operation, and the conceptual issues that arise at the junctures between nation-states and international authority, and between law and politics. While the focus is on inter-governmental organizations, the book also encompasses non-governmental organizations and public policy networks.


After years of editing the Crime and Justice series, here comes another The Oxford Handbook of Crime and Public Policy. PDF; Split View.


Crime and Public Policy

This includes examining the relationship between educational achievement among incarcerated youthful offenders and successful community reintegration. The research has shown that those youth who experience disproportionate increases in academic achievement are more likely to return to school following their release and if they remain in school, their likelihood of re-arrest drops significantly. His current research is concerned with elderly financial fraud that is centered upon a national survey of citizens aged 65 or over concerning their fraud-related victimization experiences.

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Crime and Public Policy

Edited by M. After years of editing the Crime and Justice series, here comes another thumping great volume from Michael Tonry. As with most handbooks, you need at least two hands to pick it up. Weighing in at well over pages, it has 24 substantive chapters written by different authors together with an editor's introduction. Well, what is distinctive here is that the focus is not primarily either on the criminal justice system or on the causes of crime, though neither are ignored. Rather, its

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The debate about crime and its control has in recent years featured regular appearances by actors voicing public demands for greater security and punishment on the one hand and those seeking to prevent crime by means of some kind of technical or expert intervention on the other. These positions—which are often termed populism and technocracy—appear to press conflicting claims. Proponents of technocracy conversely worry that crime policy risks being unduly influenced by vote-chasing politicians and mass media demonization and driven by an emotive irrationalism concerned more with symbolic display than effective performance in tackling crime. Often today, discussions about how to respond to crime appear to be a contest between these two seemingly diametrically opposed positions. These ways of thinking about and acting upon crime have of late received considerable attention in criminology. In the case of populism, research has generally sought to identify the social conditions that have led to the emergence of penal populism as a force such as declining deference and loss of trust in authority or has tried to explain the role of populism in generating the penal excess experienced across the USA and the Anglophone world in recent decades e. Bottoms ; Pratt


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This introduction to the book starts by defining crime. It explains that cross-national agreement about what should and should not be considered as criminal is narrower than is sometimes recognized. Examples are given of various acts that are regarded as criminal in some countries but not others.

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The Oxford Handbook of Crime and Public Policy offers a comprehensive examination of crimes as public policy subjects. Much of the scholarly literature and principal books on criminal justice and crime control policy take the operations of the criminal justice system, the causes of crime and delinquency, theories about crime and justice, and crime prevention as the central topics for study and policy analysis. But law enforcement and public officials create policy responses to specific crimes, not broad categories of offenses.

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